and water management? Finally, on the Concurrent List are matters relating to law, marriage, succession, personal law, transfer of property other than agricultural land, economic and social planning, trade unions, social security, education, electricity, and production or/and trade in, products of any industry deemed by the Parliament as best controlled by the Center. In practice, however, this classification does not describe the real picture, as it exists. By and large, the Center ultimately prevails in several important areas where Central control or intervention is considered to be expedient in the public interest by the Parliament. For instance, the industries, an item on the State list, the Center is given power to legislate over such industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by the law of Parliament to be expedient in the public interest. Similarly, in the areas where concurrent powers are to be exercised, a law enacted by a State, if found to be contradictory to any provision of law enacted by the Center in the same area, then, the former will become null and void and the latter will prevail. This Indian federation worked as two tier structure until-1993 when through 73 rd and 74 th amendments to constitution, other institutions of rural and urban Local governments were created. This tier of government is yet to attain the maturity level. The responsibilities assigned to it could not be properly institutionalised in spite of the fact that being closer to the people local governments could be the ideal for the provision of local public goods. So far as financial resources of such governments are concerned such institutions are largely dependent on the devolutions from State government. However local governments, for certain schemes, do receive financial grants directly from Central government also. To recommend the amount to be devolved to the Local governments, Finance Commission was created at State level.
3.2: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM
To carryout their functions the various levels of governments require specific fiscal arrangements. The fiscal federal arrangements that are provided in the Constitution adopted by independent India in 1950 were largely the logical extensions of the Government of India Act, of 1935. Jurisdictions over tax revenue were assigned according to the following scheme where five categories of taxes were provided;
1. Taxes, which are levied, collected and retained by the Central government.
2. Taxes, which are levied and collected by the Central government but wholly, assigned to the States.
3. Taxes which are levied and collected by the Union government but the net proceed is shared with the States. This category of taxes is also known as divisible pool. 4. Taxes, which are levied by the Union but, collected and retained by the States.
5. Those taxes, which are collected, levied and retained by the States.
In a major restructuring of the above scheme the 80 th amendment to the Constitution in 2000 all the Central taxes were made shareable.
Assignments of revenue sources to respective layers of government and their constitutional responsibilities do not seem to have any correspondence.
Amongst the tax sources, where the State governments have the exclusive jurisdiction (from designing the rate structure and administration to utilisation) only the tax on sale of goods yield revenue of worth mentioning magnitude.
Therefore the tax sharing constitutes the significant position of State government's revenue receipts. Besides the shareable pool, the tax mentioned under category 2 and 4 can also be the instruments, which intervene, in the fiscal matters of the States.
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Tax on personal income other than the one derived from agriculture and Union Excise duty were the notable in this divisible pool.
In addition to transfers of resources from Union to the States by means of shared tax, Article, 275 of the constitution provides for the Grants-in-aid to the State governments in whose case gap between expenditure and revenue is estimated to persist even after the devolution in the form of tax sharing.
In order to determine the quantum of States' share from the sharable pool and to determine the principle that should govern the distribution of such share amongst the States the constitution under Article, 280 provided for the Finance Commission. The Commission is appointed every five year by the President of India to assess the States' and Union government's revenue and expenditure projection for the next five years and make recommendations on the above mentioned issues and on any other matter which the President may ask for in the 'terms of reference' for each Finance Commissions.
Another channel of federal transfer is through Planning Commission. 
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A non-statutory body created and through resolution of the cabinet.
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For special category states the corresponding figure is 10:90.
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The Article provides for the grants and lending by the Union government to states for financing their expenditure on socio-economic development projects.
Thus there are, in general, three channels through which federal transfers flow to the States. The subsequent section of this chapter seeks to analyse the working of these channels. The purpose is obviously to find if there is any deficiency in the working of such agencies. It needs to be analysed if the approaches followed by these agencies are consistent with the objectives we pursue, and finally to examine if the structure of such transfers and the political economic factors inherent therein have any role in the imbalances or otherwise in State government finances.
Besides maintaining vertical balance between different layers of the governments, getting the States make their expenditure consistent with the national priorities are the major objectives of fiscal transfers. These objectives obviously entail transferring more resources to the States with less fiscal capacity for their development. As a logical corollary relatively richer States will get less because they can take care of their expenditure from their own revenues.
In fact 'equity approach' calls for balanced regional development which in turn requires greater devolution to the poor States by locating the Central projects in backward regions. Strong votary of equity approach J.M. Buchanan argued that the fiscal pressure in poor States would provide an incentive for highly skilled professional and potential entrepreneur to migrate to richer States, as they are tax conscious. Therefore if the poor States are offset for their backwardness this out migration can be checked. 55 The alternative approach advocates efficiency considerations, with Scott being its chief proponent, it favoures the deployment of factors of production where they can produce more.
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The very fact that in poor region output per unit of input is lower, keeping them in backward region will tantamount to sacrificing a portion of national output.
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There are other arguments and counter-arguments for and against these approaches, which may not be appropriate to be discussed here, but they simply produce one conclusion that efficiency and equity are the conflicting objectives, which can be achieved only at the cost of one another. Federal transfers through various agencies in India need to be examined in this context too. That is, to what extent a delicate balance could be maintained.
3.3: FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS
At the time of independence, the provisions of Government of India Act, Central level as it was ruled by Janata Party which was amalgamation of many parties who's leaders were very strong in their respective States.
As regards the other change (Central tax becoming shareable), there was first stable coalition government at the helm in Centre. In this coalition many regional parties were having decisive say.
3.3.2: Distribution of States' Share
The intricate issue is the horizontal sharing or how the States' share to be distributed amongst them. It becomes complicated because of the fact that
States are heterogeneous in terms of GSDP, population, poverty, and infrastructure etc. And as a result of this they vastly differ in terms of fiscal capacity. In view of equity objective poor States have to be accorded priority but as discussed earlier this militates against the objective of efficiency. The criteria evolved through successive Finance Commissions are presented in "In assessing the needs of the states and formulating our recommendations in regards to the sum to be paid as grants-in-aid, we have considered the budgetary position of the states and the probable amount which would accrue to them under our plan for the devolution of income tax and union excise". The National Development Council (NDC) in 1969 thus took a decision that central assistance to states plan should be by and large in the form of block/unconditional assistance and limit the CSS amount to 1/6th of the block assistance.
3.4: PLANNING COMMISSION TRANSFERS
formula has been revised twice (Annexure-1). The formula currently in use is known as Revised Gadgil Formula, which is as under 
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The earlier versions of the Gadgil Formula are mentioned in the annexure-1. A few issues relating to CSS have been raised in the academic literature.
It has been often stated that proliferation of CSSs creates administrative problems for the State and Local bodies. Further, with ever increasing CSS, the fiscal transfer to the States becomes more discretionary rather than formulae based, which may not be desirable in the interest of fiscal federalism. A problem associated with CSSs is that the Central Government designs the parameters within which the schemes operate and this often deprives State governments of the flexibility that may be needed to take account of local conditions. Another problem is the releases of Central assistance which are linked to timely submission of utilisation certificates, a discipline imposed to ensure that transfers lead to actual expenditures. It has been stated that the practice of requiring utlisation certificates before releasing subsequent trenches of assistance can harm implementation, especially when certain types of works can only be done in certain months of the year.
3.6: FEDERAL TRANSFERS AND VERTICAL IMBALANCE
As has been discussed earlier in the chapter that the resource transfer from Twelfth Finance Commission, however, recommended that this automatic entitlement should be dispensed with and instead, States to be asked to approach market where they will have to impress the creditor with the soundness of their finances to services the debt. Market will also charge the risk premium on their lending to the States, which, in its judgment, are risky client. So far as horizontal imbalance is concerned it could be the result of historical and geographical factors. Therefore any rigidity in the system will not only widen the imbalance but federalism itself may be threatened.
Therefore the arrangements of transfers provide the federalism with necessary flexibility to keep the federation going and to minimise the inequalities among
States / regions. It also helps, to a certain degree; in harmonising the States' financial activities and gearing them towards the national objectives.
As the present chapter analysed that there could be defects in the system, Some kind of tussle, over the share of resources between the Centre and the States are bound to prevail in any federal system. But the same federal system should also act as a cohesion that keeps the federation going. Flexibility provided in the system should not be stretched to the limits in either direction.
India's federal financial system has certainly contributed to the financial harmony of federalism. Evidence does not suggest that States ever faced imbalances in their finances because of the working of the federal system and the transfers.
